Journal of Business Economics and Agribusiness, Volume 3, Number 2, 2026, *Page*: X1-14

Enhancing Market Access of Smallholder Farmers: Interaction Patterns of AE Clusters with Institutional Buyers

Glenda Tongcua-Orlanes[1], Rowena RT Baconguis[2]
[1]Xavier University – Ateneo de Cagayan
[2]UP-Los Banos

DOI:
https://doi.org/10.47134/jbea.v3i2.1082
*Correspondence: Glenda Tongcua-Orlanes
Email: glendaorlanesjan22@gmail.com

Received: 11-01-2026
Accepted: 27-02-2026
Published: 12-03-2026

,

Abstract: This study examines the patterns of interaction between AE clusters and different market players as they implement various market integration strategies. Employing a case study design, the research utilized in-depth data collection from multiple sources. Primary data were gathered through key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and in-depth interviews with cooperative officers, cluster leaders, and Agroenterprise Facilitators (AEFs).The findings reveal that successful market integration of smallholder farmers requires a comprehensive approach characterized by effective communication, collaboration, trust-building, structural alignment, and strong coordination mechanisms. Establishing strategic partnerships between organized farmer groups and institutional buyers fosters sustained marketing engagement. Furthermore, collaborative efforts and cooperation among AE clusters, Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Organizations (ARBOs), and institutional buyers are essential to achieving inclusive and sustainable market integration.

Keywords: *Market Access*; *Interaction Patterns*; *Agroenterprise Clusters*

Introduction

Several strategies have been developed to help smallholder farmers effectively participate in the market. One strategy is linking farmers to institutional buyers such as small and medium enterprises (SMEs), private companies, donor-supported groups, and nongovernment organizations (Tacastacas, 2010; Sjjau-Koen-Fa, Blok, & Omta, 2016) by organizing smallholder farmers into Agroenteprrise (AE) clusters. The clustering is based on the farmers farm location and according to the crops they produced.

As they apply the clustering approach, agroenterprise (AE) clusters engage with market participants, allowing smallholder farmers to collectively deal with institutional buyers (CRS, 2014). These exchanges show how farmers organize themselves together for group marketing and engage in market-driven endeavors which help improve product quality, meet bulk demand, and secure better prices.

Despite these strategies, agricultural system in which smallholder farmers work is marked by unfair value chain structures and power disparities. Farmers encounter difficulties with limited assets, poor market access, and insufficient technological and financial capabilities as markets change and are restructured (Digal, 2021). To enhance

livelihoods and value distribution, innovation and new market strategies are required, but these developments also call for adjustments from institutional buyers as well as farmers.

However, only few studies were conducted to understand how interaction patterns, institutional processes, and market integration strategies influence the performance and successful integration of clustered smallholder farmers into institutional markets.

Therefore, this study intends to understand how smallholder farmers interaction with each other in a cluster and with the institutional markets which aimed at analyzing the patterns of interaction between smallholder farmers and institutional buyers using various market integration strategies.

Research Method

Research Design

The study used a qualitative case study design to explore market interaction among smallholder farmers focusing on interactions among the cluster members, with the cooperative organizations and with institutional buyers. It examined two Agrarian Reform Beneficiary Organizations (ARBOs) in Northern Mindanao, COOP1 in Siloy, Calamba, Misamis Occidental, producing copra and ginger, and COOP 2 in Impalutao, Impasugong Bukidnon, producing citronella oil, both from Mindanao, Philippines.

Population, Sample, Sampling

This study employed a qualitative multiple-case design to examine interaction dynamics among agroenterprise (AE) clusters, cooperatives (ARBOs), and institutional buyers. The approach enabled in-depth analysis of coordination processes, governance structures, and market integration mechanisms in real organizational settings.

Two (2) ARBOs in Bukidnon and Misamis Occidental, Mindanao, Philippines were purposively selected based on: (1) implementation of the agroenterprise clustering approach, (2) active crop-based clusters engaged in collective marketing, and (3) established linkages with institutional buyers. Both supply raw materials to processing firms, making them suitable for examining structured smallholder market integration.

The unit of analysis was the institutional interaction patterns among clusters, the cooperative, and buyers—covering cluster coordination, cooperative governance and market facilitation, and buyer–cooperative procurement processes.

Participants included cooperative officers, cluster leaders and members, Agroenterprise Facilitators (from DAR and municipal offices), LGU/NGO representatives, and institutional buyer representatives, all directly involved in agroenterprise operations.

Data were analyzed using descriptive, thematic, and cross-case comparative methods, allowing analytical generalization on the structural and relational factors influencing sustainable smallholder integration into institutional markets.

Intervention Procedure

This study used qualitative methods to examine interaction dynamics among agroenterprise clusters, cooperatives (ARBOs), and institutional buyers. Data were gathered from two case study areas through key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), field observations, and document review. Coordination with the

Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and local government units (LGUs) facilitated access to participants and records. Due to COVID-19 restrictions, some interviews were conducted by phone, resulting in minor delays.

Twenty-two (22) participants were involved. FGDs included cluster members, cooperative officers, and agroenterprise facilitators to capture collective perspectives, while LGU/private technicians, government representatives, and institutional buyers were interviewed individually. The use of multiple data sources enabled triangulation and strengthened credibility.

Research instruments were developed from a review of literature on market integration, cluster structures, and institutional buyer engagement. They focused on both formal and informal integration mechanisms and interaction patterns across organizational levels. The KII guide was validated by three experts and pretested with cluster members and DAR facilitators to ensure clarity and relevance. Although formal ethical clearance was not obtained, informed consent was acquired, and confidentiality and voluntary participation were strictly observed.

.

Result and Discussion

Interaction among AE Cluster Members and Cluster Officers

The study findings emphasize how crucial strong and ongoing communication between AE cluster officers and members is to the core to successful implementation of agroenterprises and market integration. Social cohesiveness, shared norms, and organized coordination mechanisms are essential components in maintaining smallholder participation in dynamic marketplaces, according to an interpretation of these findings based on current understanding on collective action and farmer organization development.

In line with the clustering strategy advocated by development programs like the Catholic Relief Services (CRS, 2014), the study shows that regular meetings and intimate communication among participants facilitate group decision-making, problem-solving, and flexible reactions to market demands. The body of research on farmer groups and collective marketing highlights how regular communication lowers transaction costs and fosters trust. The findings support this perspective, demonstrating that cluster meetings function not merely as administrative gatherings but as strategic platforms for production alignment (Fischer,2014), resolving supply issues, and reinforcing accountability.

Principles of collective accountability are further reflected in membership qualifications and rules. The necessity to commit to a certain product volume for collective marketing assures that participation is serious even when membership is voluntary. This is consistent with cooperative governance theories (Harris,1996;Ansell,2007), which emphasize well-defined member responsibilities to stop free riding. One prevalent problem in communal enterprises is "pole vaulting," which is defined as side-selling or failing to achieve contracted volumes. The cluster's practice of jointly establishing sanctions and guidelines for compliance points to an in-house enforcement system that promotes institutional sustainability.

The significance of structural integration is emphasized by the creation of a consensus-based "production module" that establishes shared production standards. Consistent quality (Shiferaw,2008) and volume are guaranteed by uniform production protocols (Guidi,2011), which are essential prerequisites in formal and institutional markets. This confirms what is already known, which is farmers that follow standardize production methods and coordinate planting dates have greater success integrating smallholder markets. It follows that the cluster's ability to meet contractual commitments and uphold buyer confidence is directly impacted by technical cooperation at the production level.

Risk-sharing behavior within the cluster is also evident in product supply commitment arrangements, where members jointly decide and modify committed volumes. Mutual support networks and adaptive capacity are demonstrated by the emergence of buffer mechanisms in the event that members fail to supply the committed volume of product. Research findings emphasized that, social capital in the cluster stabilizes supply reliability and reduces individual production risks, both of which are essential for long-term market participation.

Operational efficiency is further strengthened through interaction with cluster officers. A systematic management system is established inside the cluster by the clearly defined responsibilities of postharvest coordinator, production coordinator, and cluster head. Alignment between production techniques and market demands is ensured by close coordination between officials and members throughout the planning, monitoring, and delivery phases. This demonstrates how effective shared leadership (Trechter,2003) and position definition improve accountability and coordination, which is consistent with organizational management concepts. The inference is that effective group marketing performance is greatly influenced by internal organizational structure.

.



Figure A. Interaction among members and officers of AE clusters.

Figure A illustrates that interaction within the AE cluster as structured and function-based rather than random. The cluster leader is centrally positioned, with strong coordination links to coordinators and members, confirming that leadership is operationally embedded in daily production, marketing, and consolidation activities—not merely symbolic.

Strong interaction between the cluster leader, production coordinator, and members highlights close technical coordination in implementing production standards. Likewise, the postharvest coordinator shows strong links related to marketing and volume consolidation, indicating accountability in meeting agreed supply commitments, and maintaining quality. In contrast, administrative officers such as the secretary and treasurer are connected through lighter coordination lines, suggesting that financial and membership tasks require interaction but are less intensive than production and marketing functions.

This reinforces that effective market integration relies on (1) strong internal communication, (2) centralized yet participatory leadership, (3) functional role specialization, and (4) coordinated supply commitment mechanisms. It demonstrates that both social cohesion (trust and collaboration) and structural coordination (clear roles and accountability) are essential for sustaining smallholder participation in institutional markets.

Interactions of AE Clusters with the Cooperative (ARBO)

The study demonstrates that sustainable market integration requires a structured meso-level link between AE clusters and the cooperative (ARBO). While clusters are highly effective in production and consolidation, their technical capacity is insufficient to manage the full agroenterprise development (AED) cycle, which includes market intelligence, financial management, buyer negotiation, delivery coordination, and access to credit. The cooperative provides this formal institutional framework, complementing clusters' operational strength by facilitating markets, coordinating finances (Alawode, 2025), and ensuring compliance with institutional requirements.



Figure B. Interactions of Cluster with the Cooperative

AS presented in Figure B, the cluster leader functions as a structural linkage, (Bourgeois,1990) bridging informal cluster operations with the cooperative. Following Mintzberg's structural linkage theory (1979), cluster leaders coordinate supply agreements, monitor product quality, consolidate outputs, and communicate cluster concerns. Their role underscores that relational trust (Best,2005) and functional coordination can be more critical than formal authority for effective market integration.

From an institutional theory perspective (North, 1990), AE clusters operate as informal institutions based on shared norms and practices, while the cooperative is a formal organization with codified rules and governance mechanisms. Successful integration occurs when formal rules—contracts, quality standards, financial procedures—align with informal norms of trust, cooperation, and accountability. Misalignment can compromise performance and sustainability.

The cooperative and clusters interact functionally in the following ways:

a) Market intelligence and information management (Ochieng, 2018). Clusters provide production realities while the cooperative improves analytical capacity through Market Study Teams (MST) and Supply Study Teams (SST), which improve planning accuracy and lower market risk, clusters supply production realities.

b) Agroenterprise planning and financial coordination (Gouët, 2012). To overcome capital that impede smallholder participation, the cooperative handles purchasing funds, combines supply predictions, makes loans accessible, and serves as a financial buffer.

c)Product availability, quality compliance, delivery scheduling, and financial assistance are all guaranteed by careful coordination during implementation and product consolidation.

Through the cooperative, collective marketing (Ochieng, 2018) lowers transaction costs, logistics strains, and inefficiencies that come with smallholder supply being fragmented. The complementary relationship between AE clusters and the cooperative is central to AE clusters performance. Clusters provide social cohesion, production discipline, and mutual accountability, while the cooperative strengthens market credibility, financial stability, institutional legitimacy, and buyer confidence. Together, these interdependent structures create a system in which neither actor can function effectively in isolation. This highlights several critical factors that reinforce the successful integration (Spielman,2008), of smallholder farmers into formal markets. Interdependence among cluster members and institutional actors emerges as a cornerstone, as coordinated interactions across both informal and formal levels foster sustained participation in dynamic market environments. (Ton,2008) Complementing this, structural linkages provided by cluster leaders play a pivotal role, effectively bridging informal community networks with formal institutional systems, ensuring smoother communication and decision-making.

Moreover, alignment of institutional norms and rules significantly reduces operational conflict allowing farmers and buyers to interact within a harmonized framework that enhances performance. Financial and informational support from

cooperatives acts as an enabling factor, addressing gaps in capital and market knowledge that often constrain smallholder productivity and competitiveness. At the operational level, collective marketing strategies demonstrate clear economic advantages, as cooperative acting as business development service provider (BDS) facilitates lowering transaction costs (Abate,2018), improving price realization, and reducing the logistical burden faced by individual farmers (Onumah,2007). Finally, formalization of cooperative structures enhances credibility, making organized farmer groups more attractive to institutional buyers compared with dispersed smallholders.

Taken together, these insights underscore that successful market integration is not merely a function of individual effort, but relies on coordinated networks, supportive institutions, and strategic organization (Markelova,2010) that collectively enhance both economic and social outcomes for smallholder farmers.

Figure B presents a structured coordination model linking Agroenterprise (AE) clusters with the cooperative (ARBO) to support Agroenterprise Development (AED). The AE cluster leader occupies a central liaison role, bridging informal cluster operations and the cooperative's formal system. Strong bidirectional linkages with the production and postharvest coordinators demonstrate tight internal synchronization to ensure required volume, quality compliance (Tripathy, 2025), and timely consolidation before market engagement.

A direct and intensive connection between the cluster leader and the marketing officer highlights the cooperative's role as the market gateway, centralizing product consolidation and buyer coordination. This functional specialization allows clusters to focus on production while the cooperative manages marketing and financial intermediation, reducing transaction costs (acquire.cqu.edu.au, NaN, nd) and role ambiguity.

Minimal interaction with the manager and Board of Directors (BOD) reflects clear separation between governance, management, and operational functions, reinforcing organizational efficiency.

Overall, the figure illustrates institutionalized interdependence, clusters depend on the cooperative for structured market access, while the cooperative relies on clusters for reliable supply. Successful AED thus rely on defined roles, strong internal coordination, and effective linkage between informal farmer groups and formal cooperative governance (Tolno, 2015).

Interactions of ARBO with the Institutional Buyer

The findings show that interaction between the cooperative/farmer organization (ARBO) and institutional buyers is formalized, strategic, and central to smallholder market integration. Unlike the socially driven coordination within AE clusters, ARBO–buyer relationships operate at a managerial and structural level. The ARBO functions as a bridging institution, transforming dispersed smallholder production into a coordinated, market-compliant supply system. This reflects structural linkage mechanisms consistent with value chain governance principles and Mintzberg's (1979) coordination framework. Clear role specialization strengthens this linkage.



Figure C. Interactions of ARBO with the Institutional Buyer

.

As shown in Figure C, the cooperative manager maintains continuous operational communication with buyers, ensuring smooth transactions, while the Board of Directors (BOD) focuses on strategic partnership formation and policy oversight. This separation of governance and management reflects organizational maturity and underscores that sustainable market integration depends on competent leadership, not just farmer participation.

Collaboration enables mutual benefit, farmers supply production capacity, while buyers provide stable demand, structured procurement systems, and, in some cases, financial support such as advance payments. These arrangements reduce transaction costs (Gabre-Madhin, 2009), stabilize prices, and improve cash flow. The cooperative builds trust by reducing supply risk, standardizing quality, and absorbing logistical uncertainties—functions that would be difficult for individual farmers to perform.

Structured coordination mechanisms, including purchase orders, negotiated pricing, delivery protocols, and performance evaluation, align ARBO systems with formal procurement processes. This institutional alignment enhances efficiency and reduces uncertainty, demonstrating that participation in institutional markets requires organizational capacity (Ferris,2014, Gabre-Madhin,2009) and formal systems beyond production capability.

Across cases, successful integration depends on synchronized actions among AE clusters (production planning and standardization), ARBOs (coordination (Aitken, J. (1998) and market analysis), and buyers (supplier evaluation and procurement management). The process is therefore multi-actor and interdependent, not a simple buyer–seller exchange.

Overall, the study confirms a transition from informal, trader-dominated marketing to structured, inclusive partnerships. Sustainable smallholder integration is driven by managerial coordination, structural linkage, trust-building, risk-sharing mechanisms (TS

Maurya, nd), and strategic alignment between farmer organizations and institutional markets.

Interactions of Cooperative/Farmer Organization (ARBO) with Institutional Buyers

The findings reveal a layered system composed of internally cohesive agroenterprise (AE) clusters, a formally structured cooperative (ARBO), and institutional buyers operating (Shiferaw, 2011) through professional procurement systems, rather than viewing market participation as a simple linkage between farmers and buyers. As demonstrated in Figure D, sustainable smallholder integration into institutional markets is best understood as a multi-level coordination structure, where social cohesion, formal governance, and structured market engagement operate in alignment (Kilelu, 2017)



Figure D. Summary Interactions between AE Clusters, ARBO and Institutional Buyer

AE clusters are the foundation of the system, and their effectiveness is dependent on ongoing member engagement, well-defined operational responsibilities, consensus-based decision-making, uniform production modules, and supply commitment enforcement mechanisms. Collective action theory is best understood as a multi-level coordination structure where social cohesion, formal governance, and structured market engagement work in harmony. These findings support the idea that trust, shared norms, and internal accountability lower transaction costs and opportunistic behavior.

Endogenous self-regulation is demonstrated by the existence of adaptive mechanisms, such as buffer supply arrangements and penalties to address "pole vaulting." This demonstrates that external market credibility comes after internal governance capability. Only when clusters compel strict production coordination can the volume, quality, and timing dependability that institutional customers demand be met. Therefore, strong cluster governance structures that unite scattered farmers into a unified production unit are the first step toward internal market integration.

Clusters lack the formal managerial mechanisms required for ongoing institutional engagement, despite having robust production and consolidation operations. As a result, clusters and the cooperative (ARBO) develop structural complementarity. Utilizing Douglass North's institutional theory, AE clusters operate as unofficial organizations controlled by customs and common practices, whereas the cooperative is an example of a formal organization with established regulations, financial systems, and administrative power. Formal governance systems and informal production standards must coincide for integration to be successful participation. Production is the focus of clusters while ARBO specializes in a) market research; b) planning for agroenterprises; c) consolidation and projection of product supply, d. intermediation in finance and purchasing money; e) facilitation of credit; and f) coordinating logistics and negotiation.
Relational coherence gives way to formal managerial procedures at the market interface. Structured procurement processes that include need analysis, specification creation, supplier assessment, negotiation, purchase orders, and performance review are used by institutional buyers. In this case, ARBO acts as the institution that bridges the gap by: a) converting a distributed supply into a single volume, b) enforcing adherence to quality standards, such as restrictions on aflatoxin and moisture, c) discussing terms of delivery and pricing, d) enabling pricing lock-ins and upfront payments, and e) taking on coordination and logistical risks (Pelimina, 2015) Strategic supply security (stability, diversity) or inclusive business goals (social enterprise goals, CSR alignment) are the main reasons institutional purchasers get involved. Reliability and quality control, however, continue to be key factors in determining continued involvement regardless of motive.

As presented in Table 1, the agroenterprise system operates across three interdependent levels. This structure demonstrates, vertical coordination from farm production to institutional procurement ((Bizikova, 2020), horizontal coordination within clusters and cooperative management, clear governance hierarchy (from BOD to the → Manager then to the → Marketing Officer), and functional specialization that reduces inefficiencies. This system lowers transaction costs for buyers while reducing individual risk exposure for farmers.

Table 1: Three- level Agroenterprise Coordination Structure for Smallholder Market Integration

Level	**Core Function**	**Key Actor**	**Nature of Coordination**
Cluster	Production & consolidation	Cluster leader & coordinators	Strong internal interaction
Cooperative	Market facilitation & finance	Manager & marketing officer	Structured managerial coordination
Institutional Buyer	Procurement & evaluation	Purchasing/marketing officer	Formal contractual engagement

Results of the study confirmed that sustainable smallholder market integration is not driven solely by production capacity. Instead, it requires a structurally aligned coordination system where:

- Internal cluster discipline ensures reliable production.
- The cooperative institutionalizes governance, finance, and negotiation.
- Institutional buyers operate through structured procurement systems.
- Liaison actors maintain vertical and horizontal alignment.

Thus, the cooperative functions as the institutional anchor that transforms fragmented smallholder production into organized, credible, and market-responsive supply.

For institutional buyers, the findings suggest that adapting procurement systems (Louw,2008) to engage organized cooperatives—rather than individual farmers—can enhance supply security while promoting inclusive sourcing strategies.

In sum, the study establishes that sustainable smallholder integration into institutional markets requires more than production capacity. It depends on a consistent coordination structure characterized by strong internal cluster cohesion, formal cooperative governance, clearly defined leadership roles, and structured engagement with institutional buyers. By aligning informal social systems with formal institutional mechanisms, the agroenterprise model creates a credible, market-responsive supply system that enhances farmer livelihoods while meeting institutional procurement standards.

Conclusion

This study demonstrates that sustainable smallholder market integration operates as a multi-level coordination system, anchored in strong internal structures within AE clusters, formal governance through cooperatives (ARBO), and structured engagement with institutional buyers. Smallholders seek stable prices, market access, and technical support, while buyers prioritize supply security, quality, and procurement efficiency. The cooperative serves as a pivotal intermediary, consolidating production, ensuring quality compliance, negotiating prices, coordinating delivery, and absorbing financial and coordination risks, with cluster leaders and cooperative managers functioning as structural linkage nodes that align informal production groups with formal market systems. These findings advance collective action, institutional, and value chain governance theories by showing that trust and social capital, though necessary, are insufficient without formal management, financial coordination, and clearly defined leadership. Practically, strengthening cluster governance, professionalizing cooperative administration, implementing risk-sharing mechanisms, and aligning production with market demand enhance supply reliability, smallholder participation, and efficiency. Overall, the study highlights that coordinated social and institutional frameworks are as critical as production capacity for achieving sustained, market-responsive integration.

An in-depth examination of the interaction between formal and informal institutional rules is necessary to understand how this shape decision-making, resource allocation, power relations, and governance within market integration initiatives. Further research should also analyze the roles of key actors and stakeholders in shaping institutional arrangements that support market integration. In addition, assessing how collaborative program support facilitates the formation of agroenterprise clusters and strengthens partnerships between agroenterprise clusters and farmer organizations is essential for achieving sustainable market integration.

References

Abate, G. T. (2018). Drivers of agricultural cooperative formation and farmers' membership and patronage decisions in Ethiopia. Journal of Co-operative Organization and Management, 6.

acquire.cqu.edu.au, B. N. -. 2. -. (n.d.). … of Supply Chain Collaboration on the Tanzanian Agricultural Supply Chain Performance: Roles of Partners' Commitment and Transaction Cost Management.

Alawode, A. and Chiamaka, O. T. (2025). Linking Structured Commodity Markets with Formal Agricultural Finance to Improve Value Chain Transparency and Inclusion. International Journal of Research Publication and Reviews, 6(6).

Ansell, C. and Gash, A. (2007). Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice. , 18. https://doi.org/10.1093/JOPART/MUM032

Asian Development Bank. (2007). Pro-poor to inclusive growth: Asian prescriptions.

ASFG (2010). Africa's smallholder farmers: approaches that work for viable livelihoods. A report by the *African smallholder farmers group* (ASFG). http://www.asfg.org.uk/downloads/finalasfg—africas-smallholder-farmers.pdf.

Aitken, J. (1998). Supply chain integration within the context of a supplier association : case studies of four supplier associations. .

Best, R., Ferris, S. & Schiavone, A. (2005). Building linkages and enhancing trust between small-scale rural producers, buyers in growing markets and suppliers of critical inputs. Beyond agriculture–making ….

Bizikova, L., Nkonya, E., Minah, M., Hanisch, M., Turaga, R. M. R., Speranza, C. I., Karthikeyan, M., Tang, L., Ghezzi-Kopel, K., Kelly, J., Celestin, A. C. & Timmers, B. (2020). A scoping review of the contributions of farmers' organizations to smallholder agriculture. Nature food, 1.

Bourgeois, R. (1990). Structural linkages for integrating agricultural research and extension. *(ISNAR Working Paper No. 35 The Hague: International Service for National Agricultural Research*).

Catholic Relief Services, Philippines, (2009). Getting to market: from agriculture to agroenterprise. *Catholic Relief Services, Baltimore, Maryland, USA*.

Catholic Relief Services (2014). Moving together to the market: the clustering approach to agroenterprise development for small farmers. *2nd Edition*.

Creswell, J. W. (2007). Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among

Five Approaches. *2nd Edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications*

Ferris, S., Robbins, P., Best, R., Seville, D., Buxton, A., Shriver, J. & Wei, E. (2014). Linking Smallholder Farmers to Markets and the Implications for Extension and Advisory Services.

Fischer, E. and Qaim, M. (2014). Smallholder Farmers and Collective Action: What Determines the Intensity of Participation?. . https://doi.org/10.1111/1477-9552.12060

Gabre-Madhin, E. Z. (2009). A Market for all Farmers: Market Institutions and Smallholder Participation

Gouët, C. and van Paassen, A. (2012). Smallholder Marketing Cooperatives and Smallholders' Market Access: Lessons Learned from the Actors Involved. , 18.

Guidi, D. (2011). Sustainable Agriculture Enterprise: Framing Strategies to Support Smallholder Inclusive Value Chains for Rural Poverty Alleviation. Research Papers in Economics.

Harris, A., Stefanson, B. & Fulton, M. (1996). New Generation Cooperatives and Cooperative Theory. . https://doi.org/10.22004/AG.ECON.46188

Kilelu, C., Klerkx, L. & Leeuwis, C. (2017). Supporting small holder commercialization by enhancing integrated coordination in agrifood value chains: Experiences with dairy hubs in Kenya. Experimental Agriculture, 53(2).

La'o, J. (2016). From producers to entrepreneurs: Bridging smallholder farmers to the Jollibee supply chain. *The Governance Innovation Report. Ateneo School of Governance. Ateneo de Manila University*.

Louw, A, Jordaan, , Ndanga , L and Kirsten, JF. (2008). Alternative marketing options for small-scale farmers in the wake of changing agri-food supply chains in South Africa. *Agrekon*, 47:3, 287-308, DOI: 10.1080/03031853.2008.9523801

Markelova, H. and Mwangi, E. (2010). Collective Action for Smallholder Market Access: Evidence and Implications for Africa. . https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1541-1338.2010.00462.X

Maurya, T. and researchgate.net, N. G. -. (n.d.). Facilitating Agribusiness Linkages through Extension Systems.

Mmbando, Frank, et al. (2017) The welfare impacts of market channel choice by smallholder in Tanzania, *Development in Practice*, 27:7, 981-993, DOI:10.1080/09614524.2017.1353066

Murray-Prior, et al. (2012). Theory and practice of participatory action research and learning with cluster marketing groups in Mindanao, Philippines. *Act Horti*.

North, D. 1990. Institutional change: A framework of institutional change: a framework of analysis. Retrieved from: https://econwpa.ub.unimuenchen.de/econwp/eh/papers/9412/9412001.pdfUNDP (2017, November 10). New horizons: How Inclusive Business is Helping Achieve the SDG's in the Philippines. Retrieved from https://www.ph.undp.org/content/philippines/en/home/library/privatesectorsustainabledevt/NewHorizons.html

Ochieng, J., Knerr, B., Owuor, G. & Ouma, E. (2018). Strengthening collective action to improve marketing performance: evidence from farmer groups in Central Africa. , 24. https://doi.org/10.1080/1389224X.2018.1432493

Onumah, G., Davis, J., Kleih, U. & Proctor, F. (2007). Empowering Smallholder Farmers in Markets: Changing agricultural marketing systems and innovative responses by producer organizations. MPRA Paper.

Pelimina, B. M. and Justin, K. (2015). The contribution of farmers organizations to smallholder farmers well-being: A case study of Kasulu district, Tanzania. , 10.

Shiferaw, B., Hellin, J. & Muricho, G. (2011). Improving market access and agricultural productivity growth in Africa: what role for producer organizations and collective action institutions?. Food Security, 3.

Shiferaw, B., Obare, G. & Muricho, G. (2008). Rural market imperfections and the role of institutions in collective action to improve markets for the poor.

Sjauw-Koen-Fa a, et al. (2016). Critical success factors for smallholder inclusion in high value-adding supply chains. International Food and Agribusiness Management Review.

Spielman, D. and Bernard, T. (2008.). Mobilizing rural institutions for sustainable livelihoods and equitable development: a case study of farmer cooperatives in Ethiopia: overview. Final Report.

Tacastacas, R. (2010). Value chain integration, cluster cooperation, and sustainable livelihoods: Bridging small farmers to high value markets. University of Missouri. USA.

Tolno, E., Kobayashi, H., Ichizen, M., Esham, M., Balde, B. & Lanka., S. (2015). Economic Analysis of the Role of Farmer Organizations in Enhancing Smallholder Potato Farmers' Income in Middle Guinea. , 7.

Ton, G. (2008). Challenges for Smallholder Market Access: A Review of Literature on Institutional Arrangements in Collective Marketing. . https://doi.org/10.2212/SPR.2008.5.1

Trechter, D. and Murray-Prior, R. (2003). Collaborative Groups: Themes for Success and the Role of Universities.

Tripathy, P. (2025). Enhancing Farmer-Market Linkages through Strategic Outreach. New Frontiers in Agricultural Extension Strategies.

UNDP (2017). New horizons: How inclusive business is helping achieve the SDG's in the Philippines. Retrieved from https://www.ph.undp.org/content/philippines/en/home/library/privatesectorsustainabledevt/NewHorizons.html

Uy, J, (2018). Farmers get their acts together for group marketing. Stories of agrarian reform communities in agroenterprise development. Bureau of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Development. Department of Agrarian Reform. Philippines.